Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Business Administration Dissertations

Programs in Business Administration

5-1-2016

Hacking AngelList: Third Party Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding
Matthew C. Klein

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/bus_admin_diss

Recommended Citation
Klein, Matthew C., "Hacking AngelList: Third Party Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding." Dissertation, Georgia
State University, 2016.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/8507712

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Programs in Business Administration at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

PERMISSION TO BORROW
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree
from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available
for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type.
I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted
by the author or, in his/her absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in his
absence, by the Dean of the Robinson College of Business. Such quoting, copying, or publishing
must be solely for the scholarly purposes and does not involve potential financial gain. It is
understood that any copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential
gain will not be allowed without written permission of the author.
Matthew C. Klein

NOTICE TO BORROWERS
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement.
The author of this dissertation is:
Matthew C. Klein
The director of this dissertation is:
Dr. Wesley J. Johnston
Department of Marketing
35 Broad Street, Suite 1306
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Hacking AngelList: Third Party Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding
By
Matthew C. Klein

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Of
Executive Doctorate in Business
In the Robinson College of Business
Of
Georgia State University

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
2016

Copyright by
Matthew C. Klein
2016

ACCEPTANCE
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the Matthew C. Klein Dissertation
Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has
been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Executive Doctorate in
Business in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business of Georgia State University.
Richard Phillips, Dean
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Dr. Wesley J. Johnston
Dr. Anita Luo Pawluk
Dr. Richard L. Baskerville

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... vii
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ viii
I

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1

II

LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................ 4

III

II.1

Startup Financing ........................................................................................................ 4

II.2

Crowdfunding............................................................................................................. 12

II.3

Equity Crowdfunding ................................................................................................ 18
RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................................... 20

III.1

Information Asymmetry ............................................................................................ 20

III.2

Signaling Theory ........................................................................................................ 21

III.2.1 Signaler ..................................................................................................................... 24
III.2.2 Signal ......................................................................................................................... 24
III.2.3 Receiver ..................................................................................................................... 26
III.3

Reputation................................................................................................................... 26

III.4

Third Party Signaling ................................................................................................ 27

III.4.1 Business Accelerator................................................................................................. 28
III.4.2 Investor Syndicate ..................................................................................................... 28
III.4.3 Featured Startup ....................................................................................................... 29
IV

V

METHOD ........................................................................................................................ 32
IV.1

Investment Process ..................................................................................................... 32

IV.2

Data Set Construction ................................................................................................ 34

RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 39

v
V.1

Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 39

V.2

Correlation Matrix ..................................................................................................... 40

V.3

Independent Samples T-Test..................................................................................... 41

V.3.1 Business Accelerator................................................................................................. 41
V.3.2 Investor Syndicate ..................................................................................................... 42
V.3.3 Featured Startup ....................................................................................................... 43
V.3.4 Startup Location ....................................................................................................... 44
V.4
VI

Tobit Model ................................................................................................................ 45
DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................. 49

VI.1

Discussion of Findings ............................................................................................... 49

VI.2

Contribution to Theory ............................................................................................. 51

VI.3

Limitations .................................................................................................................. 52

VI.4

Future Research ......................................................................................................... 53

VI.5

Implications for Practice ........................................................................................... 54

VII

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 55

REFERENCES............................................................................................................................ 56

vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Sources of Startup Financing ......................................................................................... 6
Table 2: Key Dates in Crowdfunding Legislation ...................................................................... 17
Table 3: Top Five Online Round Amounts ................................................................................. 34
Table 4: Representative Sample of Business Accelerator Quality ............................................. 35
Table 5: Top Five Business Accelerator Followers .................................................................... 35
Table 6: Top Five Investor Syndicate Backed Amounts ............................................................ 35
Table 7: Top Five Investor Syndicate Minimum Investments ................................................... 36
Table 8: Top Five Investor Syndicate Backed Accredited Investors .......................................... 36
Table 9: Top Five Investor Syndicate Notable Investors............................................................ 36
Table 10: Top Five Investor Syndicate Syndicated Investments ................................................ 37
Table 11: Top Five Investor Syndicate Exits .............................................................................. 37
Table 12: Top Five Investor Syndicate Followers ...................................................................... 37
Table 13: Top Five Featured Startups by Online Funding Amounts ........................................ 38
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................... 39
Table 15: Correlation Matrix ...................................................................................................... 40
Table 16: T-Test for Business Accelerator Affiliation ............................................................... 41
Table 17: T-Test for Investor Syndicate Affiliation .................................................................... 42
Table 18: T-Test for Featured Startup Affiliation ...................................................................... 43
Table 19: T-Test for California Startup Location ...................................................................... 44
Table 20: Tobit Model Fit Summary ........................................................................................... 45
Table 21: Tobit Model Parameter Estimates .............................................................................. 46

vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Stages of Entrepreneurial Firm Development ............................................................. 5
Figure 2: Signaling Timeline ...................................................................................................... 24
Figure 3: Conceptual Model ....................................................................................................... 31

viii
ABSTRACT
Hacking AngelList: Third Party Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding
BY
Matthew C. Klein
April 14, 2016
Committee Chair:

Wesley J. Johnston

Major Academic Unit:

J. Mack Robinson College of Business

This dissertation examines the effectiveness of third party affiliation signals that
entrepreneurs use to convince investors to commit financial resources in an equity crowdfunding
context. I investigate the importance of third party affiliation signals (business accelerators,
investor syndicates, and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding platform) on subsequent
online funding amounts. The data indicates that affiliation with an investor syndicate is an
effective third party affiliation signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of online
funding amounts. Business accelerators and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding
platform, by contrast, have little or no impact on online funding amounts. I discuss the
implications of the results for theory, future research, and practice.

Keywords: equity crowdfunding, signaling theory, third party affiliation, business accelerator,
investor syndicate, crowdfunding intermediary, entrepreneur, startup
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I

INTRODUCTION

The Jumpstart our Business Startups (JOBS) Act was signed by President Obama
legalizing equity crowdfunding. During the Rose Garden ceremony, Obama stated that “for
startups and small businesses, this bill is a potential game changer” (Obama, 2012). Regardless
of the enthusiasm from policy makers, regulators, investors, and entrepreneurs, it is unclear how
equity crowdfunding might change the way startups seek financing (Mollick, 2014). Equity
crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to sell equity or debt financing in a company on the Internet
(Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015). This open call and investment occurs via
online platforms (e.g., AngelList) that enable startups seeking angel financing and accredited
investors to meet and communicate.
According to Plummer, Allison, and Connelly (2015), third party affiliation signals
enhance a startups characteristics and actions. In order to achieve funding success on equity
crowdfunding platforms, startup characteristics and actions must be combined with third party
affiliations to enhance the overall signal in order to capture the attention of investors. Some
startups, such as Beepi, a site for buying and selling cars, have been successful utilizing third
party affiliation signals. In December 2014, Beepi raised a $72.7 million Series B investment led
by Foundation Capital and Sherpa Ventures valuing the company at $200 million just five
months after it launched and the investment included $2.8 million from Gil Penhina’s online
investor syndicate from AngelList (Del Ray, 2014). The subsequent investment in Beepi
represents one of the largest equity crowdfunding investments on AngelList since the platform
was founded in 2010 (Foster, 2014). Thus, the success of Beepi helps explain the research
question: what third party affiliation signals, in the context of equity crowdfunding, impact
online funding amounts?
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The purpose of this research is to investigate in an equity crowdfunding context the
effectiveness of third party affiliation signals that startups use to convince investors to commit
financial resources. I analyze 320 equity crowdfunding investments between June 2013 and
January 2016 from data obtained from AngelList, the third largest equity crowdfunding platform
in the world (Massolution, 2015). The AngelList platform is suitable for this type of research
because of its global presence and it being based in the United States, a country that permits
equity crowdfunding as of October 30, 2015 when the final rules for companies to offer and sell
securities was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2015).
Prior academic research demonstrates that investors evaluate signals sent by startups to
assess quality (Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 2011). Utilizing signaling theory (Spence,
1973), this dissertation will attempt to describe how startups align themselves with third party
affiliations to strengthen the signals associated with their actions and characteristics in order to
positively impact online funding amounts. The literature has historically focused on signaling
within the context of initial public offerings (Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes, 2009). However, no
prior research has examined third party affiliation signaling in an equity crowdfunding
environment.
The way startups signal in equity crowdfunding is distinct from the way companies signal
when pursuing initial public offerings. The decision to invest in a startup via equity
crowdfunding has higher levels of information asymmetry than companies pursuing initial public
offerings. When higher levels of information asymmetry are present, third party affiliation
signaling significantly strengthens other startup characteristics and actions in order to reduce the
noise of the signaling environment. Thus, investors may experience less information asymmetry
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regarding the signaling of startup actions and characteristics when a third party affiliation that
has a strong reputation endorses them.
To this end, I provide evidence for the importance of third party affiliation signals in the
context of equity crowdfunding. I analyze the impact of third party affiliation signals (business
accelerators, investor syndicates, and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding platform) on
subsequent online funding amounts. The data indicates that affiliation with an investor syndicate
is an effective third party affiliation signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of
online funding amounts. Business accelerators and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding
platform, by contrast, have little or no impact on online funding amounts.
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II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, I describe the various startup financing sources and introduce the concept
of crowdfunding as a new form of financing for startups. Next, I give an outline and describe the
differences between various forms of startup finance and the different models of crowdfunding.
Thereafter, I provide an overview of the equity crowdfunding market.
II.1 Startup Financing
Previous research has recognized that entrepreneurs face difficulties in selecting the right
financing source (Cassar, 2004). If an entrepreneur has an innovative idea or a large market
potential, the decision associated with financing is paramount in order to maintain the growth
projections of the firm. According to Cassar (2004), entrepreneurs have problems associated
with information asymmetry, agency costs and transaction costs when raising financing in
comparison to established companies.
The financial growth cycle paradigm (Berger & Udell, 1998) examined how financing
sources varied with firm size and age. The research described a linear relationship with
entrepreneurs as the first source of financing followed by angel investors, venture capitalists and
subsequent initial public offerings. This linear relationship was also described by Cardullo
(1999) in relation to technology based startups that follow a similar financing life cycle based on
revenue and time.
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Figure 1: Stages of Entrepreneurial Firm Development
Source: Cardullo (1999).
While previous empirical research has examined each source of financing as separate
transactions, the approach is being challenged as many entrepreneurs are no longer following the
linear path described by Berger and Udell (1998) and Cardullo (1999). Entrepreneurs are now
combining several forms of financing and this represents a new paradigm shift.
The primary reason for the shift in financing decisions by entrepreneurs is that startups
are becoming cheaper to start (Graham, 2013). Entrepreneurs can now use various social
networks (e.g. Twitter and LinkedIn) to publicly advertise their financial offerings as of October
30, 2015 when the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted final rules for companies to
offer and sell securities (SEC, 2015). The Internet has effectively removed barriers for
entrepreneurs in terms of finding customers and potential investors. Since startups need less
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financing, entrepreneurs are creating new challenges for traditional investors, especially for
venture capitalists, who traditionally invest in the equity offerings issued by startups. Because
entrepreneurs have the upper hand, they will retain larger shares of the stock and control of their
startup companies (Graham, 2013).
This shift toward the Internet for many entrepreneurs has led to the growing popularity of
crowdfunding. Traditional investors (e.g. angel investors and venture capitalists) view the
emergence of crowdfunding as a potential threat because entrepreneurs can now obtain startup
financing from the crowd. With no geographical barriers and limited costs, entrepreneurs are
transitioning to social networks and dedicated crowdfunding platforms. The recent trend toward
crowdfunding is a shift in the financing decisions for entrepreneurs. A review of the different
sources of startup financing is outlined below.
Table 1: Sources of Startup Financing
Small amounts

Large amounts

Debt
Governmental organizations
Bank loans
Bootstrapping
Friends and family
Leasing
Crowdfunding

Equity
Governmental organizations
Bootstrapping
Friends and family
Crowdfunding
Angel investors
Venture capitalists
Stock markets

The table divides startup financing by either debt or equity and the amount of capital
invested. I will discuss several of these forms of financing but from a broader perspective I want
to address how startups attain financing at the time of creation (Cassar, 2004). As stated
previously, Berger and Udell (1998) conclude that startup financing changes over time and this
change is dependent upon the size, age and degree of information asymmetry. The financial
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growth cycle paradigm describes this phenomenon as startups are financially constrained due to
limited access to external financing (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002).
In 2004, the Kaufmann Foundation collected survey data on the financing decisions of
startup companies. The data was not limited to technology based startups, but rather was a
representative sample of startups throughout the United States. According to Robb and
Robinson (2012), firms relied heavily on debt financing at the time of creation. In particular,
external financing provided by the entrepreneur was the most prevalent followed by other debt
sources such as bank loans or friends and family. In a similar study, Cole and Sokolyk (2013)
observe that 25 percent of startups are entirely financed by equity and the use of personal
financing by the entrepreneur decreases over time as the startup achieves growth.
A common misconception is that venture capital is the main driver of startup financing.
According to Gompers and Lerner (2001), the requirement to exit (acquisition or initial public
offering) is the main driver for venture capitalists. There are 28.2 million businesses in the
United States (SBA, 2014). Because of the return on investment requirements, venture
capitalists are only interested in businesses with significant growth projections. The goal is for
these startups to become a large publicly traded companies within five to seven years. This
criterion limits the venture capital firms to a small available market of businesses each year as
the majority will never attain the necessary growth projections. For most businesses outside of
the tech industry, many of them will never be considered a candidate for venture capital
financing.
What this indicates is the importance of preliminary financing steps that startups utilize
before venture capital firms are approached. The research by Cassar (2004) and Robb and
Robinson (2012) support the dependency of startups in regards to external financing
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requirements. At the time of creation, half of the external financing is derived from loans,
mainly from the startup founders themselves (Robb & Robinson, 2012). This use of loans (debt)
allows startups founders to retain larger shares of the stock (equity) until significantly larger
investments by venture capitalists are required to attain growth projections.
The American government often provides financing for startups despite asymmetric
information and the controversies that ensue when governmental organizations emulate the
financing decisions of the private sector (Cressy, 2002). According to Minniti and Lévesque
(2008), governmental organizations believe that startups play a significant role in economic
growth and therefore governmental organizations create a number of programs to encourage
entrepreneurial activity. One such activity is providing tax credits for investment in startups
(Tuomi & Boxer, 2015). According to Armour and Cumming (2006), government programs
more often hurt than help the development of venture capital and other sources of startup
financing. In contrast, Brander, Du, and Hellmann (2014) argue that markets with government
sponsored venture capital have higher levels of total venture capital financing. The results
indicate that government sponsored financing largely complements other forms of private
financing but more research is needed to study the effectiveness of government financing
programs.
A more recent phenomenon is bootstrapping whereby startup entrepreneurs use their own
savings, personal credit cards and other financial resources. The goal is for entrepreneurs to
reach as many growth milestones as possible before opening the startup to outside investors.
According to Ebben and Johnson (2006), bootstrapping refers to methods that entrepreneurs use
to limit outside financing, improve cash flow and maximize personal sources of finance.
Examples of entrepreneurial bootstrapping activities provided by Winborg and Landström (2001)
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include: using credit cards, obtaining loans from friends and family, withholding salaries or
working for below-market salaries, engaging in freelance opportunities, borrowing equipment,
delaying supplier payments and other frugal measures by the entrepreneur to limit the need for
outside financing.
The use of bootstrap financing by startups is a requirement if no other alternative source
of financing is available (Auken, 2005). As the research by Ebben and Johnson (2006)
concluded, entrepreneurs who are limited in financing options view bootstrapping as the only
way to survive. In contrast, Vanacker, Maingart, Meuleman, and Sels (2011) view bootstrapping
as a choice or the philosophical mindset of the entrepreneur.
The most likely alternative to bootstrapping is engaging angel investors for early rounds
of financing (Prowse, 1998; Wong, 2002). Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide
financing for startups. According to Shane (2012), angel investment accounts for less than 1%
of startup financing. However, the importance of angel investors can not be underestimated as
they provide financing for startups at the early stage of development.
Angel investors can also be members of a network of angels such as Tech Coast Angels
that review entrepreneurs seeking financing (Payne & Macarty, 2002). According to the Angel
Capital Association in 2013, angels invested $25 billion in 71,000 companies. On average angel
investors provide $191,000 (and a median of $50,000) in funding to startups (Wiltbank &
Boeker, 2007). In a study conducted by Harvard and MIT, angel investor support was correlated
with improvements in startup success rates (Linde, Prasa, Morse, Utterback & Stevenson, 2000).
In contrast, venture capitalists have the ability to finance larger amounts of capital across
several rounds of financing for startups. Venture capitalists operate as fund managers and seek
investment from individuals and institutions in order to provide financing to startups that offer

10
high risk and high rewards (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sahlman, 1990). A detailed literature
review on venture capital was published by Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri (2011).
Similar to angel investors, venture capitalists are equity investors who work with the
management teams of startups in various capacities. In many cases, venture capitalists support
professionalization measures such as assistance with recruiting talented employees, corporate
governance, hiring decisions, and replacing poor performing management teams (Hellman &
Puri, 2002). The evidence suggests that the behavior of venture capitalists is beyond those of
traditional financial intermediaries because their contracting behavior enables them to overcome
problems associated with information asymmetry (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000). Previous
research has extensively documented how venture capitalists add value to the companies in their
investment portfolios (Gompers, Kovner & Lerner, 2009; Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir, 1996).
However, the availability of exit opportunities is important to both angel investors and venture
capitalists (Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007; Schwienbacher, 2008). Historically speaking, the most
common practice of exit is through initial public offerings for venture capitalists (Black &
Gilson, 1998).
As stated previously, entrepreneurs do not follow a predetermined path of financing that
starts with friends and family, angel investors and then venture capital. Instead entrepreneurs
may trade off different forms or even combine several forms simultaneously. Typically, startup
financing research is based on specific databases (such as CapitalIQ, CrunchBase and
MatterMark) and not directly from the companies with the exception of the Kaufmann Firm
Surveys, which sends questionnaires to startup companies (Cole & Sokolyk, 2013; Robb &
Robinson, 2012).
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The entrepreneurial finance literature considers the choice of financing in terms of the
pecking order theory. The theory states that with an increase in asymmetric information, the cost
financing increases (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The financing is in the form of internal funds
(bootstrapping) and the issuance of new debt and equity. From a preference standpoint, startups
prefer internal funds (bootstrapping), issuing new debt and issuing equity as a last resort.
Stewart Myers popularized the pecking order theory by arguing that asymmetric
information affects the choice between issuing debt and equity. By raising debt, entrepreneurs
signal to investors confidence in the startup and the ability to repay, whereas selling equity
signals a lack of confidence (although this does not apply to high-tech industries with its
typically intangible assets). The theory assumes that startups adhere to a hierarchy of financing
options and prefer internal financing (bootstrapping) as the first option, the raising of debt as the
second option and the selling of equity as the third option. Entrepreneurs must consider these
startup capital structure decisions as they represent a signal to outside investors about the
potential success of the startup (Ross, 1977).
Previous peer-reviewed academic research has found that startups do combine several
forms of financing such as angel investors and venture capitalists (Cosh, Cumming & Hughes,
2009; Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch & Triantis, 2009). According to Goldfarb (2009), angel
investors often partner alongside venture capital firms to co-invest in the same round via
syndication. In many cases, the combination of two types of co-investors serve as a
complimentary role to the startup (Wong, 2002). According to Robb and Robinson (2012),
several traditional forms such as bank financing, angel investors, and friends and family are
combined at startup formation.
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Previous research has investigated the motivations of entrepreneurs in terms of selecting
one form over the other or combining several forms of financing together. In addition, previous
research also has examined the choice between angel investors and venture capitalists.
According to Elitzur and Gavious (2003), the difference is angel investors are constrained in the
amount of investment they can provide. However, with the rise of super angels (Sudek &
Wiltbank, 2011) this distinction is no longer applicable.
In many cases, the contractual arrangements (liquidation preferences, voting provisions,
anti-dilution and information rights) with angel investors may complicate later-round contractual
arrangements with venture capitalists. Chemmanur and Chen (2003) assume that angel investors
are passive investors who only provide money while venture capitalists are actively involved
with the investment. Depending on the round of financing (Seed, Series A, Series B, etc.)
entrepreneurs may switch investor types and Schwienbacher (2013) observes that investors may
differ in their degree of focus and specialization. By comparing the round of financing with the
type of investor (specialists versus generalists) entrepreneurs must take into account the potential
tradeoff. Specialists who invest only in one stage of development may improve the chances of
securing follow-up financing from other investors, whereas generalists secure funding along the
different stages of development. In situations of information asymmetry, entrepreneurs may
signal quality by choosing specialists to help guide them to the next round of financing.
II.2 Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is a type of fundraising, conducted via the Internet, in which a large
number of people pool relatively small individual investments in order to fund a specific purpose
(Ahlers et al., 2015). The literature on the topic is relatively new and this explains a number of
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nuances in how crowdfunding is defined as academic research emerges to develop consensus.
The definition by Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010), explicitly defines crowdfunding as
“the financing of a project or a venture by a group of individuals instead of professional parties”.
This definition emphasizes that there is no intermediary as entrepreneurs are raising money
directly from the crowd. In theory, the majority of individuals already invest albeit indirectly
through their savings which typically is managed by intermediary institutions such as banks, so
crowdfunding implies a more direct interaction between investors and entrepreneurs.
Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2014) elaborated on the definition of a more
general concept of crowdsourcing provided by Kleemann, Voß and Rieder (2008) in order to
define crowdfunding as “an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of financial
resources either in the form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some form of
reward to support initiatives for specific purposes”. Mollick (2014) and Bradford (2012),
acknowledge that crowdfunding essentially draws inspiration from microfinance (Morduch,
1999) and crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006), but still represents a unique category of financing
enabled by the rapid expansion of Internet platforms serving as crowdfunding intermediaries.
According to Mollick (2014), the “popular and academic conceptions of crowdfunding are in a
state of evolutionary flux” by highlighting the definition from Belleflamme et al. (2014) does not
include alternative forms of crowdfunding such as peer-to-peer lending. In response, Mollick
(2014) provides for a narrower definition in an entrepreneurial context: “crowdfunding refers to
the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund
their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of
individuals using the Internet, without standard financial intermediaries.”

14
The three primary reasons for selecting crowdfunding were identified by Belleflamme,
Lambert and Schwienbacher (2013) from interviews with entrepreneurs. The main reason given
by all the respondents using crowdfunding was collecting funds. In addition, attracting the
attention of the public and obtaining feedback on products and services were also motives for the
entrepreneurs using crowdfunding. Gerber, Hui and Kuo (2012) conducted a similar study
identifying five types of incentives: receiving investment, building connections, self-affirmation,
product exposure, and the subsequent success story. Thus, crowdfunding is uniquely positioned
to provide entrepreneurs in the early stages with an alternative financing option (Hemer, 2011).
More importantly, market participants (namely investors) view a successful crowdfunding
campaign as a positive signal about the future of a startup.
The recent changes in the crowdfunding legal environment gives consumers the ability to
become investors (Ordanini, Miceli, Pizzetti & Parasuraman, 2011). Consumers investing in
crowdfunding projects believe in the startup and are willing to prepay for products or services.
Using crowdfunding in this manner, the startup is able to build a customer base quickly and send
a positive signal to the market. According to Burtch, Ghose and Wattal, (2013) crowdfunding
increases product consumption and visibility. Crowdfunding also allows for easier access to
potential customers, the opportunity for press coverage for successful campaigns, and interest
from potential outside investors and employees (Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014).
Similar to bootstrapping, crowdfunding allows startups to test their product-market fit
with potential customers. Most startups fail due to their inability to identify potential customers
(Blank, 2013). In a theoretical model, Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010)
illustrate how pre-ordering via reward-based crowdfunding facilitates price discrimination. This
method of bootstrapping allows startups to identify potential customers with a high willingness
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to pay. In a subsequent paper, Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2013) develop a
theoretical model for startups to help them decide between the profit-sharing or pre-ordering
model of crowdfunding.
Previous academic research has examined the investment decision and subsequent
participation of investors as well as their respective motivations. The findings suggest that
investors are more than just financially motivated. Research conducted by Allison, Davis, Short
and Webb (2014) and Lin, Boh and Goh (2014) demonstrate that intrinsic and extrinsic motives
and social reputation were apparent signals from investors. The findings also illustrate that the
motivation to participate in crowdfunding is dependent upon the business model (Lin et al.,
2014; Ordanini et al., 2011). In a previous study employing a grounded theory approach the
findings demonstrate that investors have similar attributes to one another. These attributes
include: an innovation orientation, a desire for interaction with entrepreneurs, personal
identification with the startup product or service, and a keen interest in the success or financial
results (Ordanini et al., 2011). Subsequent interviews of entrepreneurs and investors also
confirmed these same motivations and the importance of social networks (Gerber et al., 2012).
Investors prefer the interaction that social networks provide to help breakthrough the
noise of the signaling environment on crowdfunding platforms. Previous peer-reviewed research
has investigated the impact of social networks on investment decisions. The subsequent results
indicate a correlation between the reduction of information asymmetries via social networks and
the increase in funding (Lin, Prabhala & Viswanthan, 2013). A consequence of social networks
is the prevalence of herding behavior (Zhang & Liu, 2012). As an example, Bryce Roberts, the
cofounder of O’Reilly AlphaTech Ventures wrote a blog post about why he deleted his
AngelList account. In the post, Roberts describes AngelList as being in the business of
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generating “heat” for startups by allocating a substantial amount of importance to what
AngelList describes as “social proof” (Roberts, 2011). Sharing the same conclusions, Robert
Scoble, a futurist at Rackspace, described the AngelList platform as a place where “investors
tend to be pack animals and tend to want to get in on hot deals and AngelList makes the hot deals
happen fast” (Scoble, 2011).
Entrepreneurs and investors benefit by having the crowdfunding platform serve the role
of an intermediary in transactions (Haas & Leimeister, 2014). The crowdfunding platform helps
reduce information asymmetries and also operates to facilitate information, communication, and
investment (Allen & Santomero, 1997; Brealey, Leland & Pyle, 1977). Different types of
investment models exist for each of the crowdfunding platforms. One of the most common is the
all-or-nothing approach where the entrepreneur only receives the investment if they achieve a
pre-defined threshold for the project. Whereas entrepreneurs receive all the investment in the
keep-what-you-get model. These different investment models help reinforce the increasing
specialization of crowdfunding platforms as the intermediaries focus on particular market
segments and niches. Thus, intermediaries serve innovative and creative projects (Argawal et
al., 2011), startups and entrepreneurs (Ahlers et al., 2015) or nonprofit projects (Burtch et al.,
2013).
Legal scholars have discussed crowdfunding since 2009 in the United States. According
to Kappel (2009), the discussion surrounded the legality of crowdfunding intermediaries and the
subsequent application of federal securities laws. These legal issues along with the crash of the
U.S. financial system in early 2008 prompted changes in legislation (Stemler, 2013). A
bipartisan legislative proposal was signed by President Obama on April 5, 2012 in order to
increase access to startup funding and was supported by many in the technology and startup

17
communities including Steve Case (founder of AOL), Naval Ravikant (founder of AngelList),
Ron Conway (founder of SV Angel) and Dave McClure (founder of 500 Startups). The purpose
of the “Jumpstart our Business Startups Act” (JOBS Act) was to make it easier and cheaper for
startups to raise equity capital. Signed on March 25, 2015, Title IV of the JOBS Act, called
Regulation A+, allows startups to offer and sell securities to unaccredited investors. Below is a
table of key dates in legislation that worked toward finalizing the rules and requirements for
entrepreneurs, investors and intermediaries.
Table 2: Key Dates in Crowdfunding Legislation
Date
September 8, 2011
November 3, 2011
March 22, 2012
March 27, 2012
April 5, 2012
September 23, 2013
March 25, 2015
October 30, 2015
May 16, 2016

Description
President Obama mentions crowdfunding in his jobs speech.
The House passes H.R. 2930 in 407-17 bipartisan vote.
The Senate passes the JOBS Act amended with the Crowdfund Act.
The House passes the Crowdfund Act.
President Obama signs the Crowdfund Act into law.
SEC implements Title II of JOBS Act.
SEC passes Title IV allowing non-accredited investors.
SEC Adopts Final Rules to Permit Crowdfunding.
SEC final rules and forms are effective.

Using data from the Kickstarter platform, Mollick (2014) found that as the campaign
duration and overall funding amount increases, the probability of success decreases on the
platform for reward-based crowdfunding efforts. In order to increase the likelihood of funding,
entrepreneur’s need to have a large social network, a product video and be geographically
located near sources of capital. In a similar study, Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) confirm
that entrepreneurs with large social networks (i.e. Facebook friends) are more likely to be
successful.
The distance between entrepreneurs and investors was studied by Agrawal, Catalini and
Goldfarb (2011). Using data from the Sellaband music platform, the average distance was 3,000
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miles between between the entrepreneur and investor for funded projects. Another interesting
finding from the research by Agrawal et al. (2011) was that typically the first investors were
friends and family. This discovery helps explain how the proximity between entrepreneur and
investor is smaller at the start of a funding campaign (Agrawal et al., 2011). In a similar manner,
the relationship between funding success and the distance between entrepreneurs and investors
was also present in peer-to-peer lending environments (Burtch et al. 2013) but for reasons
associated with local preferences for products and services.
II.3 Equity Crowdfunding
As of July 2015, there were 542 total crowdfunding sites in existence and 160
crowdfunding platforms facilitating equity crowdfunding or revenue sharing models. Worldwide
equity crowdfunding nearly tripled in 2014 compared to 2013 with an annual growth rate of
182% to reach $1.11bn. However, the North American market ($787.5m) grew faster (301%)
compared to the European market ($177.5m) growth rate (145%) in 2014 (Massolution, 2015).
The average size of an equity crowdfunding campaigns differs significantly by region. In
2014, in North America the average campaign size was $175,000, 57% of the average campaign
size in Europe, where the average was $309,124. The highest regional averages, however, were
in Asia (where China dominates the crowdfunding market) and Oceania (where Australia is the
leading crowdfunding player) with average campaign sizes of $342,260 and $307,474
respectively. From a worldwide perspective, average equity-based campaign size has increase
on average by 30.5% in 2013 to reach $248,035 and a further 11.06% in 2014 to reach $275,461.
This increase in average size indicates that the average size of a successfully funded equity-based
campaign has increased by $145% since 2011.
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The total funding volume of equity crowdfunding platforms was approximately $1.11bn
in 2004. Between 75% to 90% of this amount was raised on seven crowdfunding platforms:
EquityNet ($250 million - $300 million), Fundable ($150 million), AngelList ($100 million),
Crowdfunder ($75 million - $100 million), CrowdCube ($75 million - $100 million),
WeAreCrowdfunding ($50 million - $75 million) and OurCrowd ($50 million - $75 million).
Therefore, the majority of this amount occurred on sites based in the United States and these
figures are expected to continue to grow (Massolution, 2015).
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III

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this section, I develop a framework based on Spence (1973) and Plummer, Allison and
Connelly (2015) for how third party affiliations are related to online funding amounts. In this
context, I define and use three different third party affiliations based on reputation signaling: (1)
business accelerator affiliation; (2) investor syndicate affiliation; and finally (3) featured startups
on the AngelList equity crowdfunding platform.
III.1 Information Asymmetry
Two different types of information impact the decision processes used by companies,
individuals and governments. Information that is widely available to the public and is known as
public information, and information that is only available to a limited group of individuals,
which is known as private information. Individuals base decisions on the character of the
information and according to Stiglitz (2002), when “different individuals know different things,”
information asymmetries occur. Therefore, when information is not known publicly, information
asymmetries occur among individuals who are aware of the details of such information, and
those who may have been able to make more informed decisions if they had access to the
information.
Historically, decision-making processes for formal economic models were based on the
assumption of perfect information and information asymmetries were overlooked (Stiglitz,
2002). The economists assumed that marketplaces faced with information asymmetries would
operate the same way as marketplaces with perfect information (Stiglitz, 2000). The Nobel Prize
in Economics was presented in 2001 to George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for
their efforts in studying information economics. Academics have dedicated much of their
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careers in order to understand the magnitude to which information asymmetry impacts
marketplace decision-making.
According to Stiglitz (2000), the categories of information where asymmetry plays a
critical role are quality and intent. In terms of quality, it is significant when one individual or
company is not entirely cognizant of the characteristics of the other party. Whereas, the same
can be true when one party is apprehensive about another party’s conduct or objectives (Elitzur
& Gavious, 2003). For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the role of third party
affiliation signals in order to understand how investors resolve information asymmetries in
relation to an entrepreneur’s latent and unobservable quality in an equity crowdfunding context.
III.2 Signaling Theory
Signaling theory has an intuitive nature which explains why many find it to be persuasive
in nature too. Spence, who was the first to put forth this theory, was asked by a journalist if it
might be possible that a person could obtain the Nobel Prize in Economics by observing that
participants in marketplaces are not aware of the information that other participants in the
marketplace may hope to share (Spence, 2002). Spence answered that the correct response was
most likely “no” and thus the increase in the capturing of informational aspects of marketplace
configurations. The underlying basis of signaling theory is assigning a cost to information
acquirement activities. These costs help to resolve information asymmetries.
Spence (1973) used the labor market in his explanation of signaling theory in order to
design the signaling function of education. In many circumstances, employers do not have
enough knowledge about the quality of potential job applicants. To help reduce information
asymmetries, potential applicants would often highlight their educational background to signal
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quality. Employers would regard education as a quality signal since lower quality candidates are
not capable of meeting the demands of higher education.
Another example, which helps explain a signaling model is illustrated by Kirmani and
Rao (2000). As with most examples of signaling theory, Kirmani and Rao (2000) delineate
among two characteristics: high-quality companies and low-quality companies. Even though the
companies are aware of their own true nature, individuals who are considered outsiders such as
investors and consumers do not know this information asymmetry exists. For that reason, every
company can decide whether or not to signal its actual quality to outsiders. If a high-quality
company decides to signal, they obtain Outcome A, in consequence, if the company does not
signal they obtain Outcome B. Consequently, low-quality companies will obtain Outcome C
upon the decision to signal, and Outcome D upon the decision not to signal. Therefore, the use
of signaling is an appropriate tactic for high-quality firms once A > B and once C > D. This
example is even more evident when high-quality companies are interested in signaling and lowquality companies are not, resulting in a separating equilibrium. When this happens, outsiders
(such as investors) can differentiate between high-quality and low-quality companies.
Consequently, a pooling equilibrium results (Cadsby, Frank & Maksimovic, 1990) when highquality companies and low-quality companies benefit from signaling together. When this
happens, outsiders cannot distinguish clearly between both types of companies.
Several examples demonstrating these relationships have been developed by financial
economists. For example, Ross (1973) illustrated how firm debt represents a signal of quality
and Bhattacharya (1979) demonstrated how dividends also provide a signal of quality to
investors. The separating equilibrium example is best explained via interest or dividend
payments as only high-quality companies have the capability of paying whereas low-quality
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companies are unable to maintain the expense on their balance sheets. Therefore, these signals
of quality greatly effect lender and investor perceptions. Understandably so, many of the
concepts of signaling theory are based in the economic and financial literature (Riley, 2001).
The distinguishing characteristic of signaling is quality. However, quality can be inferred
in different methods. According to Spence (1973), quality is the unobservable ability of the
individual signaled by the achievement of education. In contrast, Ross (1973) views quality as
the unobservable ability of an organization to achieve returns greater than the cost of capital in
order to generate positive cash flow. For the purposes of this dissertation, quality will refer to
the ability of the entrepreneur (signaler) to achieve funding from investors (outsiders) who are
observing the third party affiliation signal in the context of an equity crowdfunding platform
(e.g., AngelList).
The relationship between information asymmetry and signaling theory is illustrated by
the timeline in Figure 2. The timeline describes three primary entities, the entrepreneur as the
signaler, the investor as the receiver and the signal being sent. The illustration also accounts for
a possible feedback loop between the entrepreneur and the investor within the constraints and
noise of the signaling environment. In the context of equity crowdfunding, the crowdfunding
platform typically encompasses the sending and receiving of multiple signals between
entrepreneurs and investors. For example, an investor may observe multiple and sometimes
competing signals sent by the entrepreneurs of a company. For the purposes of this illustration,
we explain the theoretical concept in the simplest form with an entrepreneur and investor
communicating using one signal. The method is consistent in the way signaling theory has been
described for transaction-specific information.
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t=0
ENTREPRENUER
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(third party
affiliation)

t =1
SIGNAL
Sent to investor

t=2
INVESTOR
Observes and
interprets signal

t=3
FEEDBACK
Sent to entrepreneur

Signaling Environment
Note: t = time
Figure 2: Signaling Timeline
III.2.1 Signaler
The foundation of signaling theory is the concept of entrepreneurs (signalers) as insiders
who obtain information that is not available to investors (e.g. outsiders). The entrepreneurs
acquire or have information, both positive and negative, which investors would consider material
and useful. This acquired information could be comprised of details such as the performance of
the services and products of the company. It could also include information regarding initial
research and development results or the the companies’ sale pipeline. Other types of
information, such as pending lawsuits or patent disclosures, are also acquired by entrepreneurs.
This confidential information gives entrepreneurs an advantage regarding the quality they wish
to portray to investors.
III.2.2 Signal
Entrepreneurs acquire both positive and negative information and must decide how to
share this information with investors. The basis of signaling theory is communicating positive
information about the startup in order to positively impact startup qualities and attributes. Few
academic researchers have investigated actions that have been taken by entrepreneurs, which
resulted in the communication of negative information regarding startup attributes or quality.
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For example, issuing new equity in a company is generally considered a negative signal since
historically the issuing of new equity is conducted when the price of the company’s stock is
inflated (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Entrepreneurs need to guard their actions in order to not send
negative signals since this reduces information asymmetry in a counterintuitive manner.
The focus of signaling theory is the actions entrepreneurs take to purposely communicate
positive and sometimes imperceptible qualities. However, not all of these actions are useful as
signals. Investors are typically inundated with observable actions by entrepreneurs and must sort
through the noise of the signaling environment in order to identify signals of quality. There are
two main features of effective signals: signal observability and cost. Signal observability
signifies the extent to which investors are capable of perceiving the signal. If actions are not
easily perceived by investors, then they have not risen above the noise of the signaling
environment. The theory of costly signaling (BliegeBird, Smith, Alvard, Chibnik, Cronk,
Giordani & Smith, 2005) illustrates the second feature of effective signals. The cost associated
with signaling is based on principal that some entrepreneurs absorb costs better than others. For
instance, the cost of obtaining a patent can be expensive, but makes for the threat of entry by
competitors less likely and makes false signaling problematic. However, obtaining patents is
less costly for high-quality entrepreneurs in comparison to low-quality entrepreneurs due to
experience curve effects. If an entrepreneur sends a signal without the underlying quality but is
confident the signal outweighs the cost of sending the signal, then the entrepreneur is trying to
falsely signal to investors. In these situations, misrepresentative signals would quickly escalate
until investors learn to disregard the signals altogether. Therefore, to maintain the effectiveness
of signals, costs must be controlled so that disingenuous signals do not profit.

26
III.2.3 Receiver
The investor (receiver) is the third characteristic of the signaling timeline. Investors are
essentially outsiders, who lack information and would like to receive information regarding the
startup or entrepreneur. In addition, entrepreneurs and investors could have slightly conflicting
interests which could lead to a successful lie providing an advantage to the entrepreneur at the
cost of the investor (BliegeBird et al., 2005). For signaling to occur effectively, the entrepreneur
should profit from the investor in some way. For instance, the entrepreneur might offer the
investor some alternatives such as choice about investing in debt or equity. Previous peerreviewed academic research has tested signaling theory in a variety of settings including
shareholders and debtholders as receivers (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Elliott, Prevost & Rao,
2009). A key component of signaling is that investors will benefit in the same manner as the
entrepreneur from the decisions generated by the information obtained from signals. To be
specific, investors will profit from acquiring shares in a startup that signals a productive and
profitable future and the same is true for the entrepreneur.
III.3 Reputation
Traditional markets for the financing of early-stage startups rely heavily on due diligence
predicated on face-to-face interactions and personal relationships. In the equity crowdfunding
setting, entrepreneurs disclose as much information as they wish and then rely on an ethos of
“trust me”. Third party affiliations (business accelerators, investor syndicates, and crowdfunding
intermediaries) may influence the efficacy of a “trust me” environment by facilitating markets
for reputation. In other words, in equity crowdfunding markets, as in many other online markets,
reputation and trust are particularly important. The important role of reputation as a mechanism
for establishing trust to address the risk of fraud in online transactions was emphasized by Cabral
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(2012) by stating: “While there are various mechanisms to deal with fraud, reputation is one of
the best candidates – and arguably one of of the more effective ones”. Intermediaries (e.g.,
AngelList) have developed mechanisms for establishing trust through reputation. Bernstein,
Korteweg and Laws (2014) demonstrated the importance of networks in signaling quality in an
equity crowdfunding context. In their empirical analysis, they used reputation as an information
category by measuring the number of followers on the AngelList platform. For the purposes of
this dissertation, I also measure the reputation of the third party affiliations (business accelerator,
investor syndicate) with the number followers on AngelList.
III.4 Third Party Signaling
Third party signaling is more important at the early stage of investment. Investing in a
startup generally has considerable information asymmetry and more unpredictability than that
which exists for an IPO (Kirsch, Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009). Startups typically offer less reliable
information to their investors, and when seeking potential investors to invest capital in their
startups, they may provide investors with information that is selective and unregulated or
misleading. In truth, startups may not be able to provide sufficient information simply because
they do not yet possess a proven track record that allows them to demonstrate what they have
accomplished in the past with their money and what they have managed to achieve. That is why
the signals available to investors tend to be rather ambiguous and unpredictable. In addition,
investors, at this initial stage of investment, are offered a great number of choices and
opportunities to consider. This unfortunately increases the noisiness and commotion of the
signaling environment, thus making it difficult for signals to be perceived (Pollock & Gulati,
2007), and complicates an investor’s evaluation of the startup. Therefore, the challenge of
influencing investors and having the credibility to convey the startup’s potential in an
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environment where signals are not perceived clearly, makes it more important than ever for
entrepreneurs to align with third party affiliations.
III.4.1 Business Accelerator
Supporting organizations such as a business accelerator that helps new startups launch
and grow are important third party affiliation signals. According to Cohen & Hochberg (2014),
business accelerators provide startups with mentorship, networking assistance, and access to
subsequent funding in exchange for a fee. Examples of prominent business accelerators include
AngelPad, Techstars, and Y Combinator. A number of resources are provided by business
accelerators to support early-stage growth for startups (Clouse & Austrian, 2011). For instance,
Y Combinator provides each batch of startups with initial access to capital for three months and a
network of investors for follow-on rounds. The startups accepted into Y Combinator, after a
highly selective application process, are provided with office space and a group of experienced
mentors to offer advice and help with identifying potential customers, partners and vendors.
Affiliation with a successful business accelerator such as Y Combinator serves as a meaningful
signal to investors. In addition, business accelerators must maintain their reputations. Thus,
business accelerators serve as an effective third party signal to investors by endorsing the quality
of the startup (Lee, Pollock & Jin, 2011).
H1: Affiliation with a business accelerator will be positively associated with online funding
amounts.
III.4.2 Investor Syndicate
Angel investors and venture capital firms have been using syndication for a very long
time (Lerner, 1994). This model has now been transferred to equity crowdfunding for a different
purpose (Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, 2015). Essentially, a lead investor (i.e. investor
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syndicate) who has access to startup deal flow and is good at evaluating startups can now transfer
those deals online for the crowd to invest. What is happening is a curation function as the
investor syndicate is selecting startups that are likely to succeed. These lead investors, acting as
a third party affiliation, are essentially substituting the signal of the entrepreneur.
If the startup is successful (acquisition or exit), the investor syndicate will earn a carry
(percentage of the upside) and this is a strong incentive for the lead investor. However, if the
startup is unsuccessful, the reputation of that investor syndicate will suffer. The crowd (capital
providers) find this setup ideal as it solves issues of information asymmetry and the difficulties
of assessing the quality of a startup at an early stage.
This is also the reason why early stage startup investment is geographically localized
(Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007). Angel investors typically invest in their respective geographical
area because they want to meet the entrepreneur and evaluate the quality of the startup.
However, in this new model of equity crowdfunding, online investor syndicates are overtaking
the model of direct investment (Agrawal et al., 2015). The investor syndicate approach
leverages the offline networks and reputation of lead investors by serving as a third party
affiliation.
H2: Affiliation with an investor syndicate will be positively associated with online funding
amounts.
III.4.3 Featured Startup
Previous research examining donation crowdfunding has identified a positive correlation
between promotion by crowdfunding platforms and subsequent funding success. The findings
indicate that being featured on Kickstarter has the greatest positive effect on subsequent pledges
(Qiu, 2013). In a similar manner, AngelList also provides a “curation” function to feature
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startups from an equity crowdfunding perspective. The AngelList team and a rotating group of
analysts from the top venture capital firms review investor syndicated startups after they are
published and feature the companies to investors (Bernstein et al., 2014). As an intermediary,
AngelList does not perform due diligence and does not focus on proposed transaction terms.
However, AngelList does believe that this curation function is valuable to startups, which may
not have the experience or the expertise to know that particular investors on the platform may be
able to help them. In addition, this curation function is also valuable to investors as they might
not have the time to examine all the different startups investments on the platform. AngelList,
acting as a third party affiliation, describes this review process for featured startups as something
similar to the due diligence process of a venture investor and thus shares a similar requirement to
maintain a strong reputation.
H3: Featured startups on AngelList have a higher online funding amount.
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IV

METHOD

The source of the data is the AngelList equity crowdfunding platform. AngelList was
founded in 2010 to operate a website (http://angel.co) allowing startups seeking investors to meet
and communicate with each other. As of January 2016, over 775 startups have successfully
raised $255 million in funding online via AngelList, and it is one of only a few equity
crowdfunding intermediaries that possess sufficient data for a statistically significant analysis.
Therefore, research on AngelList is a forward-looking illustration of how equity crowdfunding is
changing as of May 16, 2016 in the United States with the Securities and Exchange Commission
passing final rules for Title IV of the Jumpstart of Business Startups (JOBS) Act (SEC, 2015)
permitting unaccredited investors to participate in equity crowdfunding.
IV.1 Investment Process
Typically, startups begin on AngelList by creating a profile for their company. A startup
can post information about itself, its products or services, and its management team, and that
information is publicly available. Startups can also post information, including potential
fundraising activities, company traction, and investor pitch decks on a restricted portion of the
website that is not publicly available. In order to gain access to the restricted portion of the
website, a potential investor must be an accredited investor. AngelList requires proof of
accreditation from investors to meet the more stringent standards the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission has put in place, the 506(c) standard.
Investors can also create a profile on AngelList describing their background, portfolio,
and anticipated number and dollar size of investments. As of January 2016, there were 25,030
investors listed on the AngelList platform. Investors can use the platform to sort startups by
various criteria, such as location, market, technology, and industry focus.
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Investor syndicates can be formed on AngelList by accredited individuals, angel groups,
and venture capital funds. A typical investor syndicate who creates a profile online will provide
basic information such as how many deals per year they expect to syndicate and the typical
investment size. The lead investor of the syndicate also provides a written investment thesis for
all investments in addition to disclosing any potential conflicts of interest. When other
accredited investors which to invest alongside the lead investor, they are referred to as “backers”.
If accepted by the lead investor, the backer agrees to invest in the lead investors syndicated deals
on the same terms and to also pay a carry fee. All of these investments occur on the AngelList
equity crowdfunding platform.
Although it is not encouraged, backers are able to opt out of specific deals that do not
align with their investment interests. As mentioned previously, backers also pay a carry per deal
(0% - 30%) to the lead investor syndicate as well as 5% carry to AngelList. Thus, investor
syndicates operate in a similar manner to venture capitalists except for these differences:
syndicate investors can opt out of any deal or stop investing any time; syndicates have much
lower minimums; syndicates are available to the general (accredited) public; lead investors
typically personally invest more per deal than general partners of venture capital funds;
syndicates use a deal carry; and syndicates do not charge management fees.
To illustrate how this works, AngelList provides the following example on its website:
“Sara, a notable angel, decides to lead a syndicate. Investors “back” her syndicate by agreeing to
invest $200K in each of her future deals and pay her a 15% carry. The next time Sara decides to
invest in a startup, she asks the company for a $250K allocation. She personally invests $50K in
the startup and offers an opportunity to invest up to $200K to her backers.” As of January 2016,
AngelList has approximately 170 active syndicates.
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IV.2 Data Set Construction
The final data sample contains 320 equity crowdfunding startup investments published on
the AngelList platform between June 2013 and January 2016. Each of these startup investments
were funded by either a combination of online and offline accredited investors. This sample
represents the most comprehensive equity crowdfunding investment data collected in the United
States. AngelList provided a list of the 320 investments for which I was then able to build a
number of datasets using the AngelList application programming interface (API). According to
Joshua Slayton (Chief Technology Officer at AngelList), many of the investments are private
and unfortunately cannot be announced, which clarifies the discrepancy between available
investments (775) and the number of total investments (320) accessible on the website.
However, all available investments were displayed in the same manner on AngelList, and all
follow the general structure described above, thus ensuring comparability. For our sample of
320 startups, I collected five types of data: (1) online funding amount, (2) business accelerators,
(3) investor syndicates, (4) startups featured on the equity crowdfunding platform, and (5)
control variables.
In order to test our hypotheses, I use the following variables:
Dependent Variable
Online Round Amount. This measure indicates the total online funding amount that was
generated by the startup.
Table 3: Top Five Online Round Amounts
Startup
PillPack
Beepi
MD Insider
Life360
Contactually

Amount
$4,300,000
$2,800,000
$1,500,000
$1,200,000
$1,000,000
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Independent Variables
Business Accelerator. This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup is affiliated
with a business accelerator.
Quality: An integer between 0 and 10, calculated every 48 hours, and reflects the
business accelerator’s rank on AngelList. Higher numbers mean better quality.
Table 4: Representative Sample of Business Accelerator Quality
Business Accelerator
TechStars
Y Combinator
Seedcamp
Founder Institute
Mass Challenge

Quality
10
10
8
7
6

Followers: Number of users who subscribe to business accelerator’s information on
AngelList. Followers is also a measure of a business accelerator’s importance and
reputation.
Table 5: Top Five Business Accelerator Followers
Business Accelerator
500 Startups
Y Combinator
AngelPad
TechStars
Seedcamp

Followers
27,092
8,487
7,657
6,408
6,303

Investor Syndicate. This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup is affiliated with
an investor syndicate.
Backed Amount: This measure indicates the total amount of funding available to the
investor syndicate.
Table 6: Top Five Investor Syndicate Backed Amounts
Investor Syndicate
Late Stage Pre-IPO @ Flight.vc
Gil Penchina @ Flight.vc
Tim Ferriss
Paige Craig
Arena Ventures

Amount
$6,500,000
$6,300,000
$5,800,000
$4,200,000
$4,200,000
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Minimum Investment: This measure indicates the minimum investment required by a
backer to be accepted into an investor syndicate.
Table 7: Top Five Investor Syndicate Minimum Investments
Investor Syndicate
Accomplice
Mike Baker
Brick & Mortar Venture
500 Startups
Brendan Wallace

Amount
$100,000
$25,000
$12,500
$10,000
$10,000

Backed Accredited Investors: This measure indicates the total number of accredited
investors backing an investor syndicate.
Table 8: Top Five Investor Syndicate Backed Accredited Investors
Investor Syndicate
Gil Penchina @ Flight.vc
Tim Ferriss
Jason Calacanis
Dave Morin
SaaS Startups by Flight.vc

Number
1,117
1,107
870
538
443

Notable Investors: This measure indicates the total number of notable investors (as
identified by AngelList) within an investor syndicate.
Table 9: Top Five Investor Syndicate Notable Investors
Investor Syndicate
Naval Ravikant
Paige Craig
Elad Gil
Gil Penchina @ Flight.vc
Jason Calacanis

Number
13
10
10
9
8
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Syndicated Investments: This measure indicates the total number of syndicate investment
deals by the investor syndicate.
Table 10: Top Five Investor Syndicate Syndicated Investments
Investor Syndicate
FG Angels
Yun-Fang Juan
Scott and Cyan Banister
Barbara Corcoran Venture Partners
Jason Calacanis

Number
59
32
22
14
13

Exits: This measure indicates the total number of startup exits by the investor syndicate.
Table 11: Top Five Investor Syndicate Exits
Investor Syndicate
500 Startups
Naval Ravikant
Dave Morin
Betaworks
Scott and Cyan Banister

Number
68
41
27
25
25

Syndicate Followers: Number of users who subscribe to an investor syndicate’s
information on AngelList. Followers is also a measure of an investor syndicate’s
importance and reputation.
Table 12: Top Five Investor Syndicate Followers
Investor Syndicate
Naval Ravikant
Jason Calacanis
Dave Morin
500 Startups
Tim Ferriss

Number
44,285
41,442
34,838
27,037
26,173

38
Featured Startup. This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup was featured on
AngelList.
Table 13: Top Five Featured Startups by Online Funding Amounts
Investor Syndicate
Life360
InDinero
Fitmob
Vulcun
Authy

Amount
$1,200,000
$897,000
$824,000
$779,000
$754,000

Additional Controls
Financing Round: This measure indicates the stage in the startups current funding which is
classified into six categories; ‘Seed’, ‘Series A’, ‘Series B’, ‘Series C’, ‘Round’, and ‘Closed’.
‘Seed’ funding is an investment in early-stage startups before ‘Series A’, and usually angel
investors and venture capitalists invest in seed rounds. Series A, B, C are sequential rounds,
whereas ‘Seed’ and ‘Round’ are not. The ‘Seed’ round can be skipped by getting ‘Series A’
funding.
Startup Location: This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup was located in
California or in another location.
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V

RESULTS

The result section provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. In addition,
the independent samples t-test is used to test hypotheses 1 through 3, respectively. I find support
for only hypotheses 2, which states that affiliation with an investor syndicate will be positively
associated with online funding amounts. Lastly, a Tobit model regression was performed to
estimate linear relationships between variables.
V.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics
Number of
observation

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Online Funding Amount

320

$302,472

$333,019

$45,000

$4,300,000

Business Accelerator
Quality
Followers

320
320
320

0.55
4.87
3,595

4.51
6,721

0
0
0

1
10
27,092

Investor Syndicate
Backed Amount
Minimum Investment
Lead Investor Investment
Backed Accredited Investors
Notable Investors
Syndicated Investments
Exits
Followers

320
320
320
320
320
320
320
320
320

0.85
$1,037,929
$3,669
$36,525
178
2.21
10.67
5.93
6,800

$1,420,441
$8,639
$42,620
252
3.13
17.90
10.31
11,127

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
$6,500,000
$100,000
$300,000
1,117
13
59
68
44,285

Featured Startup

320

0.32

0

1

Financing Round
Startup Location

320
320

2.61
0.61

1
0

6
1

1.82

Notes: This table shows the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum value (min), and
maximum value (max) for all variables. The sample covers 320 AngelList investments.
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V.2 Correlation Matrix
Table 15: Correlation Matrix

Notes: This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for variables in Table 3 – p-values are given in parentheses below the
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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V.3 Independent Samples T-Test
V.3.1 Business Accelerator
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for
startups with affiliations to business accelerators and no affiliation to business accelerators.
Table 16: T-Test for Business Accelerator Affiliation
Group Statistics
Online Funding
Amount

IV_BA
0
1

N
144
176

Mean
308395.83
297625.00

Std. Deviation
299722.347
358745.108

Std. Error Mean
24976.862
27041.430

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

Online
Equal
Funding variances
Amount assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

F

Sig.

t

df

.228

.633

.287

318

.293 317.853

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval
Sig. (2Mean
Std. Error
of the Difference
tailed) Difference Difference
Lower
Upper
.774

10770

37474.102 -62957.662 84499.328

.770

$10770

36811.446 -61654.046 83195.713

There was not a significant difference in the scores for startups with an affiliation to a
business accelerator (M = $297,625, SD = $358,745) and no affiliation to business accelerators
(M = $308,395, SD = $299,722) conditions; t (318) = 0.287, p = 0.774. The results suggest that
online funding amounts are not impacted by affiliations with business accelerators. Specifically,
the results suggest that when a startup has an affiliation with a business accelerator, it does not
impact their online funding amounts on AngelList.
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V.3.2 Investor Syndicate
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for
startups with affiliations to an investor syndicate and no affiliation to an investor syndicate.
Table 17: T-Test for Investor Syndicate Affiliation

Online Funding
Amount

Group Statistics
N
Mean
46
222978.26
274
315817.52

Investor Syndicate
0
1

Std. Deviation
208371.195
348120.095

Std. Error Mean
30722.657
21030.704

Independent Samples Test
Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances

Online
Funding
Amount

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

F

Sig.

t

.300

.584 1.755

df

t-test for Equality of Means
Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
(2Mean
Std. Error
of the Difference
tailed) Difference Difference
Lower
Upper

318

.080 92839.257

52890.442 -196898.660

11220.145

2.494 93.664

.014 92839.257

37231.333 -166766.403

18912.112

There was significant difference in the scores for startups with affiliations to an investor
syndicate (M = $315,817, SD = $348,120) and no affiliation to an investor syndicate (M =
$222,978, SD = $208,371) conditions; t (318) = 2.494, p = 0.014. The results suggest that online
funding amounts are impacted by affiliations with investor syndicates. Specifically, the results
suggest that when a startup has an affiliation with an investor syndicate, it impacts their online
funding amounts on AngelList.
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V.3.3 Featured Startup
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for
featured startups on AngelList and for startups that were not featured on AngelList
Table 18: T-Test for Featured Startup Affiliation

Online Funding
Amount

Group Statistics
N
Mean
217
315769.59
103
274456.31

Featured Startup
0
1

Std. Deviation
380608.033
197236.485

Std. Error Mean
25837.357
19434.288

Independent Samples Test
Levene's
Test for
Equality of
Variances

F
Online
Funding
Amount

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed

Sig.

t-test for Equality of Means

t

1.712 .192 1.037

df
318

1.278 315.614

Sig.
(2Mean
Std. Error
tailed) Difference Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

.301

41313.275 39842.242

119700.971
37074.422

.202

41313.275 32330.490

104923.797
22297.247

There was not a significant difference in the scores for startups featured on AngelList (M
= $274,456, SD = $197,236) and for startups not featured on AngelList (M = $315,769, SD =
$380,608) conditions; t (318) = 1.037, p = 0.301. The results suggest that online funding
amounts are not impacted by startups featured on AngelList. Specifically, the results suggest
that when a startup is featured on AngelList, it does not impact their online funding amounts.
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V.3.4 Startup Location
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for
startups located in California and for startups that were located outside of California.
Table 19: T-Test for California Startup Location

Online Funding
Amount

Group Statistics
N
Mean
126
310976.19
194
296948.45

Startup Location
0
1

Std. Deviation
396524.975
285291.393

Std. Error Mean
35325.252
20482.728

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

Online
Equal
Funding variances
Amount assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

t-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

t

df

.015

.903

.368

318

.344 207.956

Sig. (2Mean
Std. Error
tailed) Difference Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

.713

14027.737 38154.591

89095.061
61039.587

.732

14027.737 40834.001

94529.400
66473.926

There was not a significant difference in the scores for startups located in California (M =
$296,948, SD = $285,291) and for startups not located in California (M = $310,976, SD =
$396,524) conditions; t (318) = 0.368, p = 0.713. The results suggest that online funding
amounts are not impacted on startups located in California. Specifically, the results suggest that
when a startup is located is located in California, it does not impact their online funding amounts.
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V.4 Tobit Model
A Tobit model, also called a censored regression model, was conducted to estimate linear
relationships between variables with left-censoring at 0 of the dependent variable online funding
amount. The range of possible online funding amounts is 0 to infinity. The dependent variable
(online funding amount) was rescaled by 1,000. In addition, the following variables were log
transformed to improve model fit: business accelerator followers, investor syndicate backed
amount, investor syndicate minimum investment, investor syndicate syndicated investments, and
investor syndicate followers.
Table 20: Tobit Model Fit Summary
Variable

Mean

Online
Funding
Amount

302.471

Summary Statistics of Continuous Responses
Standard
Type
Lower
Upper
Error
Bound
Bound
333.0185

Censored

0

Model Fit Summary
Number of Endogenous Variables
Endogenous Variable
Number of Observations
Log Likelihood
Maximum Absolute Gradient
Number of Iterations
Optimization Method
AIC
Schwarz Criterion

N Obs
Lower
Bound

N Obs
Upper
Bound

0

1
Online Funding Amount
320
-2270
4.6983E-13
0
Quasi-Newton
4562
4603

The Summary Statistics of Continuous Responses provides a summary of the number of
left censored values. The section labeled Model Fit Summary includes information on the
number of observations (320), the number of iterations it took the model to converge (0), the
final log likelihood (-2270), and the AIC (4562) and Schwarz Criterion (4603), also known as
BIC. The AIC and Schwarz Criterion were used to compare models results.
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Table 21: Tobit Model Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimates
Estimate
Standard Error
192.468
40.054

Parameter
Intercept

DF
1

t Value
4.18

Approx Pr > |t|
<.0001

Business Accelerator
Quality
Followers

1
1

-25.050
31.208

14.485
16.106

-1.73
1.94

0.0838
0.0527

Investor Syndicate
Exits
Backed Amount
Backed Accredited Investors
Backed Notable Investors
Minimum Investment
Syndicated Investments
Followers

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

4.828
-55.0328
0.713
23.811
90.407
-2.000
-9.779

2.452
16.106
0.108
9.085
12.297
0.992
3.238

1.97
1.94
6.57
2.62
7.35
-2.01
-3.02

0.0490
<.0001
<.0001
0.0088
<.0001
0.0439
0.0025

_Sigma

1

291.317

11.515

25.30

<.0001

Under the heading Parameter Estimates we see the coefficients, their standard errors, the tstatistics, and associated p-values. The coefficients for business accelerator quality and
followers is marginally significant. Whereas the coefficients for investor syndicate exits, backed
accredited investors, notable investors, minimum investment, syndicated investments, and
followers is statistically significant.
Tobit regression coefficients are interpreted in a similar manner to OLS regression
coefficients; however, the linear effect is on the uncensored latent variable, not the observed
outcome (McDonald & Moffitt, 1980).
The inference for this Tobit model concerns only model parameters with p-values <0.10.
The model results are as follows:
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•

A one-unit increase in business accelerator quality is associated with a $25,050
decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is marginally
statistically significant.

•

A one percent increase in business accelerator followers is associated with a $31,208
increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is marginally
statistically significant.

•

A one-unit increase in investor syndicate exits is associated with a $4,828 increase in
the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is statistically significant.

•

A one percent increase in investor syndicate backed amount is associated with a
$55,032 decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is
highly statistically significant.

•

A one-unit increase in investor syndicate backed investors is associated with a $713
increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is highly
statistically significant.

•

A one-unit increase in investor syndicate notable investors is associated with a
$23,811 increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is
highly statistically significant.
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•

A one percent increase in investor syndicate minimum investment is associated with a
$90,407 increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is
highly statistically significant.

•

A one-unit increase in investor syndicate syndicated investments is associated with a
$2,000 decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result
statistically significant.

•

A one percent increase in investor syndicate followers is associated with a $9,779
decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts. The result is highly
statistically significant.

The ancillary statistic _sigma: is equivalent to the square root of the residual variance in OLS
regression. The value of 291.317 can be compared to the standard deviation of online funding
amount which is 333.018, a substantial reduction. That _sigma is statistically significant means
that the estimated coefficient (291.317) is statistically significantly different from 0.
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VI

DISCUSSION

VI.1 Discussion of Findings
In terms of business accelerators (hypotheses 1), the results were surprising as there was
not a significant difference in the online funding amounts for startups with an affiliation to a
business accelerator. One of the many benefits of a business accelerator is assistance with
fundraising efforts (Chang, 2013). However, a number of venture capitalists, namely Chris
Lynch from Accomplice, have publicly waged war on the benefits of business accelerators
(Garland, 2014). What was also unanticipated is that as business accelerator quality (measure of
past success) increases the predicted likelihood of online funding amounts decreases. Again, this
seems counterintuitive to the benefits associated with top-tier business accelerators (AngelPad,
TechStars, and Y Combinator). The only explanation that I can provide is that as the quality of
the business accelerator increases the more likely it is that the startup has learned to successfully
bootstrap by selling early customers rather than raising money from investors (Ebben & Johnson,
2006). Whereas quality had a negative impact, business accelerator followers (measure of
reputation) increased the predicted likelihood of online funding amounts. The result is consistent
with expectations and more research is needed in this area as business accelerator quality and
followers were both marginally statistically significant.
In contrast, investor syndicates (hypotheses 2) had a significant difference in the online
funding amounts for startups with an affiliation. What is interesting in terms of the results from
the Tobit model is that the findings reinforce what is known in academic literature. Namely, that
the availability of exit opportunities is important to both angel investors and venture capitalists
(Giot et al., 2007; Schwienbacher, 2008). Thus, investor syndicates with a higher number of past
exits increase the likelihood of predicted online funding amounts.
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Another interesting finding from investor syndicates (hypotheses 2) is the contradiction
between backed amount, backed investors, syndicated investments, and syndicate followers
versus notable investors and minimum investment amount. The results indicate that a higher
number of notable investors and a higher minimum investment amount significantly increases
the predicted value of online funding amounts. Whereas, the higher backed amounts, backed
investors, syndicated investments, and syndicate followers has negative and almost neutral
predicted values for online funding amounts. The only explanation that I provide is the
consequence of herding behavior among social networks (Zhang & Liu, 2012). The investor
syndicates with large backed amounts, backed investors, syndicated investments and followers
are pack animals and tend to want to get in on “hot” deals (Scoble, 2011). Said differently,
Bryce Roberts (notable investor) described how he deleted his AngelList account because his
interest was in ideas and startups that most investors aren’t, so heat was generally a false signal.
In response, Jason Calacanis (investor syndicate with high number of backers, syndicated
investments, and followers) commented that “where there is heat that is a signal of quality”
(Roberts, 2011). Clearly, what I have described with these findings is two differentiating
investment strategies of investor syndicates operating as third party affiliation signals.
Another surprising outcome was the impact of featured startups on the AngelList
platform (hypothesis 3). Previous research examining donation-based crowdfunding identified a
positive correlation between promotion by the intermediary (e.g., Kickstarter) and online funding
amounts (Qiu, 2013). However, in the context of equity crowdfunding no such correlation
exists. Clearly, backers of donation based crowdfunding differ greatly than those of accredited
investors in equity crowdfunding. Despite the significant resources that AngelList uses to
provide a curation “function” to feature startups, the results indicate that it does not impact
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online funding amounts and that this function may in fact be not valuable to investors on the
platform who do not have the time to examine in detail all the different startup investment
opportunities. However, unaccredited investors will have the opportunity to participate in equity
crowdfunding as of May 16, 2016 when the SEC passes final rules for Title IV of the Jumpstart
our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (SEC, 2015). Perhaps this shift in policy is a forwarding
looking illustration of how equity crowdfunding and the impact of startups featured by
intermediaries will change.
VI.2 Contribution to Theory
The dissertation offers several potential contributions. First, whereas previous peerreviewed academic research generally examines the influence of signals in the context of an IPO
(Certo et al., 2009), I examine signaling in the context of an unexplored but growing source of
financing for startups: equity crowdfunding. Second, I investigate how different third party
affiliations signals (business accelerator, investor syndicate, and featured startups) impact online
funding amounts in the context of equity crowdfunding. The results indicate that third party
affiliation (investor syndicates) considerably improves a startups online funding amount.
I also contribute to theory with regards to how third party affiliation signals operate in an
equity crowdfunding environment. The value of third party affiliation signals is based upon their
ability to enhance other startup signals, such as characteristics and actions that might otherwise
go unnoticed by investors. The findings from the dissertation support the theoretical contribution
of third party affiliation in equity crowdfunding. Said differently, startups characteristics and
actions are signals that remain relatively unnoticed unless a startup combines them with a third
party affiliation (i.e. investor syndicate) to enhance the signal value, thus increasing the
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likelihood of online funding amounts. Thus, the development of the theory of third party
affiliation in equity crowdfunding
VI.3 Limitations
There are also a number of limitations to the dissertation that are worthy of mention.
First and foremost, many of the AngelList investments (59%) are private (not in public domain)
and unfortunately cannot be analyzed by researchers. Despite my efforts to obtain the private
information from AngelList, this dataset (320) is the largest to date for equity crowdfunding.
A second limitation is that the dissertation includes several binary variables, which are
crude measures. These types of measures are used to distinguish between third party affiliation
signal versus non-signal. However, future research might build upon these measures by using
count or continuous variables. For example, the featured startup third party affiliation signal
could be refined by also taking into account the number of times the startup was advertised to
potential accredited investors and by what means of communication.
A third limitation is that the dissertation did not allow the opportunity to examine the
impact of time and the sequencing of third party affiliation signals. Thus, I can only draw
conclusions about when third party affiliation signals are, or are not present. This limitation
represents an opportunity for future research by exploring how for example an investor
syndicates level of experience (measured by number of investments), past success (measured by
AngelList quality) and reputation (measured by the number of followers) fluctuates over time.
Finally, it is possible that investors on equity crowdfunding platforms (e.g., AngelList)
may be considering other, unobservable, characteristics in their investment decisions, in addition
to the third party affiliations I analyze for purposes of this dissertation. It could be useful to
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conduct a survey among investor syndicates and their backed accredited investors to explore
their investment reasons further, and perhaps learn more about market dynamics.
VI.4 Future Research
Equity crowdfunding is a novel form of capital acquisition that allows entrepreneurs to
bypass financial institutions and solicit investments directly from the public. A growing interest
in equity crowdfunding is shared by practitioners, policymakers, the media, and scholars alike.
The scope of equity crowdfunding and new laws facilitating equity transactions are generating
intense media discussion of this financing method’s merits and its problems.
Equity crowdfunding’s emergence is creating opportunities for scholarly research. As a
new and powerful tool for entrepreneurs, equity crowdfunding can help push the boundaries of
existing theory and thereby develop new theory. Many of the entrepreneurship field’s research
questions that involve startup success and failure, venture capital, angel investors, IPOs and
related topics can and should be reexamined in the equity crowdfunding context to help extend
and build theory.
Research on equity crowdfunding has the opportunity to inform important practical
issues, such how might social network theory be extended to explain the roles an entrepreneur’s
social and professional connections have in terms of funding amounts and reputation. Equity
crowdfunding also offers interesting policy implications. For example, by bridging the financial
gaps for aspiring entrepreneurs with solid ideas but little capital to support efforts to act on them,
equity crowdfunding may lead to greater participation in entrepreneurial ecosystems, especially
within geographic area whose financial markets are not fully developed.
Despite the opportunities created by equity crowdfunding research, there are also
challenges associated with conducting research in this area. For instance, detailed information
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about equity crowdfunding investors is difficult to acquire on many equity crowdfunding
platforms. Further, some of the mechanisms that support equity crowdfunding success may take
place off-line, making it difficult for researchers to measure them. Research is needed that
provides innovative solutions to deal with the challenges associated with equity crowdfunding.
VI.5 Implications for Practice
For startups, the results indicate the importance of third party affiliation, namely investor
syndicates in equity crowdfunding. The investor syndicate model incentivizes (on a performance
basis via a carry) lead investors to include other accredited investors (backers) in their deals.
This enables the lead investor to make larger investments in the startup. Therefore, the path for
many startups and accredited investors (backers) is to affiliate and participate in the deals of their
most capable peers (lead investors) via the investor syndicate model.
A strong lead investor is also bringing access to top deals that were not going to be on
AngelList or other equity crowdfunding websites. That is why accredited investors (backers) are
willing to pay carry (much like traditional venture capital) to participate in the deals. The first
billion-dollar exit via AngelList occurred in March, 2016 (Primack, 2016). The AngelList
investor syndicate led by Zach Coelius privately invested $100,000 in Cruise Automation, a San
Francisco-based developer of autonomous vehicle technology. General Motors subsequently
acquired the company for more than $1 billion in cash and stock. The investor syndicate and
subsequent investment opportunity was conducted as invite-only, which now is almost 65% of
such deals on the AngeList platform.
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VII

CONCLUSION

This dissertation is the first to conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of third party
affiliations (business accelerators, investor syndicates, and featured startups). The data highlight
how important the investor syndicate is to online funding amounts, such as the number of notable
investors participating and the minimum investment amount. It also demonstrates the
importance of reputation (as measured by followers). I also found, somewhat surprisingly, that
business accelerators and startups featured on AngelList had little or no significant impact with
regards to online funding amounts.
The findings have interesting implications for both policy makers and practitioners. For
startups that use equity crowdfunding, the data suggest that third party affiliations such as
investor syndicates that have a high level of experience (measured by notable investor status),
past success (measured by previous startup exits) and strong reputations (measured by the
number of followers) can be interpreted as effective third party affiliation signals that can
increase the likelihood of online funding amounts. Moreover, business accelerators and featured
startups on the AngelList platform do little to enhance the likelihood of attracting investors.
With respect to policy implications, the data also highlight the fact that investors on
AngelList seem to differentiate among attributes of startup quality, and they strongly value
credible third party affiliation signals. Equity crowdfunding investors seems to pay a great deal
of attention to the level of information asymmetry and the third party affiliations that startups
provide. However, at this point, the equity crowdfunding industry is still in its infancy, and thus
the data does not allow the opportunity to make meaningful evaluation of startup outcomes. I
hope such issues will be explored further as more data become available
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